The problem of how t o make a "fair division" of resources among competing interests arises in many areas of application at IIASA. One of the tasks in the System and Decision Sciences Area is the syStematic investigation of different criteria of fairness and the formulation of allocation procedures satisfying them.
PREFACE
The problem of how t o make a "fair division" of resources among competing interests arises in many areas of application at IIASA. One of the tasks in the System and Decision Sciences Area is the syStematic investigation of different criteria of fairness and the formulation of allocation procedures satisfying them.
A particular problem of fair division having wide application in governmental decisionmaking is the apportionment problem. An application has recently arisen in the debate over how many seats in the European Parliament t o allocate t o the different member countries. Discussions swirled around particular numbers, over which agreement was difficult t o achieve. A systematic approach that seeks t o formulate principles or criteria of fair division should stand a better chance of acceptance in that it represents a scientific or system analytic approach t o the problem.
INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY The a p p o r t i o n m e n t problem i s t h e problem o f d e t e r m i n i n g how t o d i v i d e a g i v e n i n t e g e r number of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o r d e l e g a t e s p r o p o r t i o n a l l y among g i v e n c o n s t i t u e n c i e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r res p e c t i v e s i z e s . The problem a r i s e s i n d e c i d i n g how t o d i s t r i b u t e a g i v e n number of d e l e g a t e s i n a l e g i s l a t u r e among t h e component s t a t e s of a c o u n t r y and a l s o i n d e t e r m i n i n g how t o d i v i d e a g i v e n number o f c a n d i d a t e s among t h e v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s r e c e i v i n g v o t e s i n a n e l e c t i o n . I n t h e l a t t e r g u i s e t h i s i s t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n problem.

I n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h e a p p o r t i o n m e n t problem h a s a l o n g and i n t e r e s t i n g h i s t o r y stemming from t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandate, " R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and d i r e c t t a x e s s h a l l b e a p p o r t i o n e d among t h e s e v e r a l S t a t e s ... a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e numbers" ( A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 2 ) . T h i s s t i p u l a t i o n l e d t o an e a r l y c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f v a r i o u s methods by which a p p o r t i o n m e n t s might b e computed. J e f f e r s o n , Hamilton, and Webster a l l a c t u a l l y p r o p o s e d methods, and many i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s i n U n i t e d S t a t e s h i s t o r y conc e r n e d t h e m s e l v e s w i t h t h e a p p o r t i o n m e n t problem a t r e g u l a r t e ny e a r i n t e r v a l s f o l l o w i n g e a c h c e n s u s , t h u s t e s t i f y i n g b o t h t o i t s p o l i t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e and i t s m a t h e m a t i c a l n o n t r i v i a l i t y . ( F o r a n h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t o f t h e problem i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s see [ 4 , 1 4 ] . ) I n Europe, t h e q u e s t i o n o f a p p o r t i o n m e n t methods d o e s n o t seem t o h a v e been d e b a t e d u n t i l t h e second h a l f o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y ,
and t h e n i n t h e c o n t e x t of p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( s e e , e . g . ,
[ 1 2 1 ) .
F o r m a l l y , t h e a p p o r t i o n m e n t problem may b e s t a t e d a s f o l l o w s .
L e t p = ( p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p s ) b e t h e p o p u l a t i o n s o f s states, where e a c h pi > 0 i s i n t e g e r , and l e t h ' , 0 b e t h e number o f s e a t s i n t h e house t o b e d i s t r i b u t e d . The problem i s t o f i n d , f o r any p and a l l h o u s e s i z e s h 2 0 , an apportionment f o r h : a n s -t u p l e o f nonn e g a t i v e i n t e g e r s 3 = ( a l , ..., a ) whose sum i s h . A solution of s t h e a p p o r t i o n m e n t p r o b 1 e m . i~ a f u n c t i o n f which t o e v e r y P and h a s s o c i a t e s a u n i q u e a p p o r t i o n m e n t f o r h , a i = f i ( p , h ) 2 0 where -A s e a r l y a s 1792 Thomas J e f f e r s o n [ l o ] , t h e n S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , p o i n t e d t o t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f u s i n g a method o f a p p o r t i o nment a f t e r e a c h c e n s u s , a s opposed t o r e l y i n g on ad hoe p r o c e d u r e s which a r e s u s c e p t i b l e o f e n d l e s s p o l i t i c a l argument and manipulat i o n . Moreover, h e p r o p o s e d a g e n e r a l and i m p o r t a n t method known t o d a y a s J e f f e r s o n ' s method ( 2 ) [41. T h i s method, l a t e r r e d i sc o v e r e d by t h e B e l g i a n m a t h e m a t i c i a n V i c t o r d l H o n d t , h a s been w i d e l y u s e d f o r t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o b l e m i n Europe
The U n i t e d S t a t e s a p p o r t i o n m e n t s b a s e d on t h e c e n s u s e s o f I n 1792 A l e x a n d e r H a m i l t o n , t h e n S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y , p r o p o s e d t h e f o l l o w i n g method [ 7 ] . Given t h e p o p u l a t i o n s ( p l , p 2 , . . . , p s ) and h , f i r s t compute t h e e x a c t q u o t a f o r e a c h s t a t e i , p i h / ( C . p . ) = q i r and c o n s i d e r t h e f r a c t i o n a l r e m a i n d e r s di = q i -1 3 lqil (where 1x1 r e p r e s e n t s t h e l a r g e s t i n t e g e r l e s s t h a n o r e q u a l t o x ) a r r a n g e d i n d e s c e n d i n g o r d e r , s a y di
Then H a m i Z t o n ' s m e t h o d i s t o f i r s t g i v e e a c h s t a t e i l q i
] s e a t s , a n d i f di i s among t h e f i r s t d = C d . terms o f t h e a b o v e l i s t t h e n i it i s g i v e n o n e more, o r Lq.1 + 1 s e a t s . T h i s method was p r o p o s e d a g a i n a f t e r t h e 1850 c e n s u s by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Samuel F . V i n t o n o f
Ohio, and was u s e d ( s u b j e c t t o p o l i t i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d amendments) f o r t h e c e n s u s e s o f 1850 t h r o u g h 1900 u n d e r t h e name " V i n t o n ' s
Method o f 1850 ."
A s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s method came t o l i g h t i n 1881 when C.W. S e a t o n , t h e C h i e f C l e r k o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Census O f f i c e , d i s c o v e r e d t h a t , w h e r e a s t h e Hamilton method, i n a p p o rt i o n i n g 299 s e a t s among t h e s t a t e s , g a v e Alabama 8 , i t g a v e h e r o n l y 7 i n a h o u s e of 300 s e a t s . T h i s phenomenon (which i s no i s o l a t e d q u i r k o f t h e Hamilton method b u t i n f a c t o c c u r s f r e q u e n tl y ) was dubbed t h e AZabama p a r a d o x , a n d was i m m e d i a t e l y r e c o g n i z e d a s a c r i t i c a l f l a w i n t h e Hamilton method.
B e g i n n i n g e a r l y i n t h i s c e n t u r y a t t e n t i o n was t h e r e f o r e f o - 
) is an bj-apportionment for h, and k is some one state for which r (pk,ak) 2 r (pi ,ai)
for 1 ( i ( s, then fk(?,h+l) = ak + 1, and fi(plh+l) = ai for i f k.
The method obtained in this way will be called the H u n t i n g t o n method b a s e d on r(p,a), and as a class such methods will be called [ 4 ] ) .
H7lntinaton m e t h o d s (see
It is obvious that all Huntinqton methods are house monotone. But Huntington himself only considered five particular choices of ranking function --these are listed in Table 1 . As an example of a Huntington method Table 2 gives the Webster allocations (r(p,a) = p/(a+j)) for a house ranging from 5 to 17 seats. That the five methods discussed by
Huntington are, in fact, all different is shown in Table 3 by the apportionments obtained for a house of 36 seats for the same sixstate example as that of Table 2 .
T a b l e 1.
The f i v e m e t h o d s o f ~u n t i n g t o n . T a b l e 2.
Sample W e b s t e r a p p o r t i o n m e n t s . which r e p r e s e n t t h e a v e r a g e d i s t r i c t s i z e s i n s t a t e s i and j res p e c t i v e l y . H u n t i n g t o n t h e n a r g u e d : "Now i n a p e r f e c t a p p o r t i o nment, t h e s e two numbers would b e e x a c t l y e q u a l ... h e n c e , i n any p r a c t i c a l c a s e , . . . i f [ t h e ] i n e q u a l i t y c a n b e r e d u c e d by a t r a n sf e r of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from o n e s t a t e t o t h e o t h e r t h e n . . . t h e t r a n s f e r s h o u l d b e made ...
. The q u e s t i o n t h e n comes down t o t h i s :
w h a t s h a l l b e meant by t h e i n e q u a l i t y between t h e s e two numbers?"
[ 9 , p. 861. H u n t i n g t o n t h e n g o e s on t o c o n s i d e r t h e a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e , I P i / a i -p j / a j l , v e r s u s t h e r e l a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e ,
Assume t h a t i and j a r e c h o s e n s o t h a t pi/ai 2 p j / a j ; t h e n t h e r e l a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e i s p . a . / p . a . -1 . Suppose t h e r e l a t i v e 1 1 1 1 d i f f e r e n c e i s c h o s e n a s t h e " r i g h t " m e a s u r e o f i n e q u a l i t y . Then i t i s e a s i l y shown t h a t a = ( a l , ..., a ) i s a n a p p o r t i o n m e n t s u c h -s t h a t n o t r a n s f e r c a n b e made between two s t a t e s t h a t r e p . ) a n d a i l whose d i f f e r e n c e s l e a d t o W, SD, a n d J r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
. , a s ) i s o b t a i n e d a s a I H u n t i n g t o n method s o l u t i o n w i t h r ( p , a ) = p / { a ( a + l ) } i , t h a t i s , EP -[ 4 ] . S i m i l a r l y , t h e t e s t pi/ai -p . / a . l e a d s t o t h e Harmonic Mean
3
--and whose r e l a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s a l l r e s u l t i n EP [91 . I t 
i s i n t e r --e s t i n g t o n o t e i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t H u n t i n g t o n ' s a p p r o a c h t o J was
q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m J e f f e r s o n ' s ; m o r e o v e r H u n t i n g t o n was a p p a r e n tl y n o t aware o f J e f f e r s o n ' s p r o p o s a l .
H u n t i n g t o n ' s g o a l was t o show t h a t EP i s t h e b e s t o f t h e f i v e -m e t h o d s , b e c a u s e it i s b a s e d on what he f e l t was t h e m o s t n a t u r a l m e a s u r e o f d i f f e r e n c e --n a m e l y , t h e r e l a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e . I n t h i s h e was s u p p o r t e d by two s e l e c t c o m m i t t e e s which r e p o r t e d t o t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e N a t i o n a l Academy o f S c i e n c e s , o n e i n 1929 [ 5 ] and
o n e i n 1948 [ I l l . T h e s e r e p o r t s b o t h a r g u e d f o r EP b e c a u s e , o f -a n d y i e l d s a p p o r t i o n m e n t s t h a t a r e " n e u t r a l ... w i t h r e s p e c t t o e m p h a s i s o n l a r g e r a n d s m a l l e r s t a t e s " [ 5 ] .
The e x i s t e n c e o f h o u s e monotone methods b a s e d on r a n k i n d i c e s o t h e r t h a n H u n t i n g t o n ' s f i v e had a p p a r e n t l y e s c a p e d o b s e r v a t i o n .
THE TWO BASIC PROPERTIES By h i s t e s t s of i n e q u a l i t y H u n t i n g t o n r e s t r i c t e d t h e f i e l d t o f i v e p a r t i c u l a r m e t h o d s , b u t d i d n o t c o n v i n c i n g l y s i n g l e o u t a n y o n e method a s u n e q u i v o c a l l y " b e s t . " Here we a s k , what a r e t h e e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h t h e c l a s s o f H u n t i n g t o n
methods from a l l o t h e r s ? The a n s w e r i s s u r p r i s i n g l y s i m p l e .
The f i r s t b a s i c p r o p e r t y o f H u n t i n g t o n methods --h o u s e monot o n i c i t y --h a s a l r e a d y b e e n m e n t i o n e d : i t was, i n d e e d , t h e f u nd a m e n t a l m o t i v a t i o n f o r t h e s e m e t h o d s . But t h e H u n t i n g t o n m e t h o d s a r e n o t t h e o n l y h o u s e monotone methods --f o r example t h e Q u o t a Method i s a h o u s e monotone method t h a t i s n o t a ~u n t i n g t o n
method [ I , 41 .
A f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f h o u s e m o n o t o n i c i t y r e v e a l s a s e cond b a s i c p r o p e r t y t h a t w e c a l l i n t h i s c o n t e x t c o n s i s t e n c y .
I f M i s any h o u s e monotone method, a n d f i s a s o l u t i o n o f M, t h e n ---f o r a n y g i v e n p o p u l a t i o n s p t h e o p e r a t i o n o f f c a n b e f u l l y d e -
w -s c r i b e d by s p e c i f y i n g , f o r e a c h h , w h i c h s t a t e g e t s t h e " n e x t " ( i . e . , ( h + l l s t ) s e a t . F o r i n g o i n g from f ( p , h ) t o f ( p , h + l ) , e x a c t l y o n e s t a t e must g e t o n e more s e a t w h i l e a l l t h e o t h e r s s t a y
t h e same. Why d o e s some s t a t e i , h a v i n g p o p u l a t i o n p i a n d c u rr e n t a p p o r t i o n m e n t a i = f (el h ) , g e t t h e ( h + l ) s' s e a t i n s t e a d o f some o t h e r s t a t e j w i t h p o p u l a t i o n p and a p p o r t i o n m e n t a = j j f j ( p , h ) ? E v i d e n t l y b e c a u s e s t a t e i " d e s e r v e s " i t more t h a n j .
I n c o m p a r i n g t h e r e l a t i v e c l a i m s t o a n e x t r a s e a t between a n y t w o s t a t e s i and j , t h e o n l y r e l e v a n t
d a t a s h o u l d b e t h e i r popu l a t i o n s pi a n d p and t h e i r c u r r e n t numbers o f s e a t s a i and a j' j'
T h a t i s , M d e f i n e s a p a r t i a l r e l a t i o n > on t h e set X o f p a i r s o f --.
i n t e g e r s ( p , a ) , p > 0 , a > 0 , a s f o l l o w s :
-( p , a ) 2 ( q , b ) i f and o n l y i f t h e r e i s some p , h
I n t h i s c a s e we s a y ( p , a ) h a s weak p r i o r i t y o v e r ( q , b ) . I t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t i f ( p , a ) ( q , b ) by some M t h e n t h i s i m p l i e s t h e r e i s a problem w i t h p o p u l a t i o n s p
- 
and some h a t which M g i v e s a s e a t s t o t h e s t a t e w i t h p o p u l a t i o n p and b s e a t s t o t h e s t a t e w i t h p
n t e r m s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e method
M .
-
THE CHARACTERIZATION
Theorem. An a p p o r t i o n m e n t method M i s h o u s e monotone and c o n s i s t e n t i f and o n l y i f i t i s a H u n t i n g t o n m e t h o d .
The p r o o f o f t h i s t h e o r e m n e e d s two key lemmas c o n c e r n i n g
t h e r e l a t i o n k. The f i r s t , which c o n t a i n s t h e meat o f t h e a r g u m e n t , i s e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n .
Lemma 1 . L e t t be t h e p r i o r i t y r e l a t i o n o f a h o u s e monotone and c o n s i s t e n t a p p o r t i o n m e n t method M. I f ( p , , a l t .
R e c a l l t h a t i f T i s any b i n a r y r e l a t i o n on some s e t S , t h e n t t h e t r a n s x , X , . . . ,x E S. C l e a r l y vt i s a l w a y s t r a n s i t i v e ; and vt i s i r r e f l e x i v e and t r a n s i t i v e i f v i s i r r e f l e x i v e and a c y c l i c . L e t s b e t h e t r a n s i t i v e c l o s u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n -i n Lemma 1 ; t h e n a i s s y m m e t r i c a n d t r a n s i t i v e .
D e f i n e ( p , a ) = ( p , a ) f o r a l l p a i r s ( p , a ) E X , S O t h a t --i s a n e q u i v a l e n c e r e l a t i o n . L e t -X = X/= b e t h e q u o t i e n t s e t o f X by =. Now d e f i n e t h e b i n a r y r e l a t i o n p on X x TI by ( y , z ) E p i f a n d o n l y i f ( p , a ) > ( q , b ) f o r some , ( p , a ) E y and some ( q , b ) E z .
W e c l a i m t h a t p i s a c y c l i c . I f n o t , t h e n t h e r e i s a s e q u e n c e 1 2 1 y , y , .. . l y k~ TI, k 1 2 , s u c h t h a t ( y , y 2 ) E p , ( y 2 , y 3 ) E p , -. .,
Hence t h e r e a r e e q u i v a l e n c e c l a s s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
( p i r a i l E yi and ( q i l b i ) E yi s u c h t h a t i i i i = ( q , b ) f o r e a c h i , 1 2 i 5 k , s o t h a t e i t h e r ( p , a ) = i i i i ( q i , b i ) o r e l s e t h e r e i s a c h a i n i n X s u c h t h a t ( p , a ) = (p, , a l )
-...," i i i i ( p n r a n ) = ( q , b ) .
From t h e s e a n d ( 3 ) we i m m e d i a t e l y der i v e a c h a i n t h a t c o n t r a d i c t s Lemma 1 . Hence p i s a c y c l i c , and
i n p a r t i c u l a r asymmetric a n d i r r e f l e x i v e .
L e t pt b e t h e t r a n s i t i v e c l o s u r e o f p ; pt i s t h e n a s t r i c t p a r t i a l o r d e r on X. W e now need
Lemma 2 . I f n i s a s t r i c t p a r t i a l o r d e r on a c o u n t a b l e set S , t h e n t h e r e e x i s t s a r e a l -v a l u e d ; o r d e r -p r e s e r v i n g f u n c t i o n $ :
S + R ; t h a t i s , ( x , y ) E I T i f a n d o n l y i f $ ( x ) > $ ( y ) .
P r o o f .
F i r s t w e show t h a t IT i s c o n t a i n e d i n a c o m p l e t e o r d e r 1 2 IT* on S . L e t x , x ,... b e a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f S w i t h t h e p o s i t i v e i ' i n t e g e r s , and l e t Z b e t h e s e t o f a l l o r d e r e d p a i r s ( x , x J )
, where 2 i < j and x i , x j E S.
Z i s a l s o c o u n t a b l e . L e t z 1 , z ,. .. b e a i ' c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between Z and t h e p o s i t i v e i n t e g e r s . L e t ( x l x J ) = a ( I f t h e r e i s no s u c h z , IT i t s e l f i s c o m p l e t e . ) a S i n c e IT i s t r a n s i t i v e , I T U {~ } i s a c y c l i c , h e n c e a 1 = ( a~{ z~~)~ i s 
i ' z b e t h e f i r s t i n t h i s s e q u e n c e s u c h t h a t n e i t h e r ( x , x J ) E
T h a t n i s c o n t a i n e d i n a c o m p l e t e o r d e r i s a s p e c i a l c a s e o f a r e s u l t known a s S z p i l r a j n ' s Theorem (which S z p i l r a j n a t t r i b u t e s t o Banach, Kuratowski and T a r s k i [ 1 5 ] ) . The e x i s t e n c e o f a r e a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a c o m p l e t e o r d e r on a c o u n t a b l e s e t i s a s p e c i a l c a s e o f a r e s u l t of Debreu 161.
The proof o f t h e t h e o r e m i s now c o m p l e t e d a s f o l l o w s .
S i n c e -t h e s e t X of a l l p a i r s ( p , a ) i s c o u n t a b l e , X = X/= i s a l s o c o u n t -
e t I$ : X + R b e a n o r d e r -p r e s e r v i n g f u n c t i o n r e l a t i v e t o P t a s g u a r a n t e e d by Lemma 2. From w e t h e n d e f i n e r : X + R s u c h t h a t r ( p , a ) = 4 (y) i f and o n l y i f y i s t h e e q u i v a l e n c e c l a s s o f = cont a i n i n g (p, a ]
.
W e c l a i m t h a t M, t h e h o u s e monotone, c o n s i s t e n t method o f
Lemma 1 , i s t h e H u n t i n g t o n method b a s e d on r ( p , a ) . I n d e e d l e t f E M . F o r any p s u p p o s e t h e r e i s a f i r s t h s u c h t h a t f ( p , h )
= -. - - ( a l , a 2 , . .
. , a s ) i s a H u n t i n g t o n a p p o r t i o n m e n t f o r h ( b a s e d on r ) b u t f ( p , h + l l i s n o t . Then t h e r e must be d i s t i n c t s t a t e s i and j
. -s u c h t h a t r ( p i , a i ) , a . ) b u t f g i v e s s t a t e j t h e ( h + l ) s t > r ( p j ]
s e a t . L e t u s s a y t h a t a s e q u e n c e S = ( ( p l , a l ) , ( p 2 a 2 ) . . . r ( p k t a k ) ) i s c o n s t r u c t i b l e , w r i t t e n C ( ( p l , a l , ( p 2 , a 2 ) ,. . -( p k r a k ) t if t h e r e e x i s t s f E. M s u c h t h a t , f o r some q = ( q l , . . . , q s ) , S > k , s a t i s f y i n g ----qi -P 1 , q i -P 2 , ... ,qi -pk a n d some h , we h a v e f ( q , h ) = a . Suppose t h a t C ( ( p , a ) , ( q , b ) ) , a n d l e t f E M, p a n d h b e s u c h ---
t f o l l o w s t h a t i f S i s c o n s t r u c t i b l e , t h e n it i s c o n s t r u c t i b l e f o r t h e p o p u l a t i o n v e c t o r ( p l r p 2 , . . . , p k ) s i n c e cons i s t e n c y p e r m i t s o n e t o i m i t a t e t h e s o l u t i o n f o r q r e s t r i c t e d t o
s e q u e n c e o f p a i r s (
h a t i s , t h e r e c o r d o f how s t a t e s i a n d j w e n t --
from z e r o s e a t s e a c h t o a n a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f a a n d b r e s p e c t i v e l y .
A f t e r e l i m i n a t i n g r e d u n d a n t e l e m e n t s from t h i s s e q u e n c e w e o b t a i n t h e h i s t o r y H ( a , b ) f o r p , q . E v i d e n t l y , s i n c e f_ i s h o u s e monotone, a n y e l e m e n t ( x l , 5 ( q , x 2 ) a n d if ( x l , x 2 + 1 ) f o l l o w s ( x l , x 2 ) t h e n ( q f x 2 ) 2 ( p t x l ) .
W e r e p r e s e n t H ( a , b ) by a t a b l e a u o f form:
Any sequence S = ( (pi , a i ) ,... , (pi a i ) ) s u c h t h a t ( p i r a i )
Throughout, t h e r e l a t i o n 2 i s t h a t g i v e n t o u s by t h e method M. Case l a . I£ also x3 < b, then (xlrx3+l) E H(al,a2) and is an M-apportionment for h+l satisfying (4) and (5), a contradiction.
Lemma la. No s t r i c t c y c l e i s c o n s t r u c t i b l e .
Proof. Suppose t h a t (
p l , a l ) 2 ( p 2 , a 2 ) h.. .> ( p k , a k ) 2 ( p l ,
k ) . T h e r e f o r e , by c o n s i s t e n c y s t t h e r e e x i s t s an e x t e n s i o n g of f h such t h a t g g i v e s t h e ( h + l ) s e a t t o s t a t e i -1 . C o n t i n u i n g i n t h i s manner we e s t a b l i s h t h a t p i i -p i l , a i 1 ) 1 5 i k . But t h i s c o n t r a d i c t s t h e a ssumption t h a t f o r some i , ( p i -l l a i -l ) > ( p i r a i ) . Hence S i s n o t c o n s t r u c t i b l e .
Hence x = b. We cannot also have xl < a, because then the 3 history H(a,b) would imply that (xl+l rb) E H (arb) , so that (prxl)
2 (qrx3) = (q,b) contrary to (7).
Case I b . x3 = b and xl = a. Then we have (q,x2) 3 (p,a) by (6) and (p,a) 2 (q,b) by the hypothesis of the lemma, so is an apportionment for h+l satisfying (4) and (5), a contradiction.
Case 2 . x3 = x2. If xl < a and x2 = x3 < b, then the successor of (x1,x2) in the history H(a,b) determines whether state 1 or state 2 gets the (h+llst seat and in either case (4) and (5) are satisfied, a contradiction. If xl < a and x2 = x3 = b then (pIxl) (q,b) by the history and (xl+l ,b,b) is an ;-apportionment for h+l satisfying (4) and (5), again a contradiction. Finally, if x1 = a and x2 = x3 < b then (a,x2+l,x2) is an ;-apportionment for h+l satisfying (41 and (5), which is a contradiction once again. d e f i n e nS t o be t h e number o f a i s u c h t h a t a i = bS. W e s a y t h a t j j s e q u e n c e S p r e c e d e s T, w r i t t e n S < < T i f e i t h e r bS < bT o r bS = bT and nS < nT.
C l e a r l y a n y s e q u e n c e o t h e r t h a n a t r i v i a l o n e o f form S = ( ( p , O ) ) h a s a p r e d e c e s s o r .
Suppose, c o n t r a r y t o Lemma 1 , t h a t ( p l , a l )
( p l , a l ) i s a s t r i c t c y c l e S. By Lemma l a S i s n o t c o n s t r u c t i b l e , h e n c e i n p a r t i c u l a r bS > 0 . W e may t h e r e f o r e assume i n d u c t i v e l y t h a t S i s t h e " f i r s t " s t r i c t c y c l e ; i . e . t h a t T < < S f o r no s t r i c t c y c l e T.
A l s o , we may assume (by r e l a b e l l i n g i f n e c e s s a r y ) t h a t a 2 = bS. W e s h a l l now d e r i v e a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . it follows that the set of R-undominated elements in V -E is nonempty. Let vR = { v E V -E : not w R v for any W E V } f a.
Finally, let v* = (pe,xp) be a maximum element of vR relative to 2 . Notice that v* cannot also be maximum in V relative to k, for if it were then by consistency there would exist an M--a p p o r t i o n m e n t f o r h l + l g i v i n g t h e C h ' + l ) s t s e a t t o s t a t e R . Moreo v e r , t h i s would a g r e e w i t h t h e g i v e n h i s t o r i e s , c o n t r a d i c t i n g o u r assumption on h ' .
W e c l a i m
For any wo E V -E t h e r e i s a c h a i n W~X W~-~. .
.Rwo i n R V -E s u c h t h a t wn E V , hence v * ): wn 2 ... >wo. I n p a r t i c u l a r , E c a n n o t be empty, e l s e v* would b e maximum i n V. Suppose ( 9 ) i s f a l s e , and l e t Cpirxi) = ( p . , a i ) b e any element of E . ~i r s t , i f i f 1 , l e t j b e t h e l a r g e s t i n d e x Zess t h a n i such t h a t ( p , x j ) ,e! E. j (Such a j always e x i s t s by t h e assumption t h a t ( 9 ) i s f a l s e . )
Then ( x j r a j + l ) E H ( a j , a j + l 1 , hence ( p j , x j 2 ( P~+~ , a j + l . Moreover, by assumption on S , Cpj+l , a j + l ) > ( p j + 2 , a j + 2 ) t . . . 2 ( p i r a i l . But ( p j , x j ) , ( p j + l a j + l ) . . . , (pi , a i ) h a s been c o n s t r u c t e d , s o by Lemma l a it c a n n o t be a s t r i c t c y c l e .
Hence ( p j , x j ) 2 ( p i r a i l .
Second, i f i = 1 t h e n ( p 2 , a 2 ) @ E i m p l i e s ( a l , x 2 ) E H ( a l , a 2 ) s o ( p 2 , x 2 ) 2 ( p l , a l ) . S i n c e i n t h e above argument ( p i r x . ) was a r b it r a r y i n El it f o l l o w s t h a t f o r a l l ( p i r a i ) E E t h e r e e x i s t s ( p j x . ) , e! E s u c h t h a t ( p j , x j ) ): (pi , a i ) . But t h e n v* would be maximum 3 i n V , a c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Thus ( 9 ) i s e s t a b l i s h e d .
S i n c e v* = ( p R , x R ) c a n n o t b e maximum i n V, b u t v* wo f o r a l l W~E V -E , t h e r e must e x i s t W E E , s a y w = ( p j , a ) , such t h a t w > v*. Suppose t h a t j > R . Observe t h a t s i n c e ( p R e l l a R -l t ( p i , a & ) , Lemma 1 b t e l l s us t h a t C ( p t , a R ; p R , a t ) . Hence, by Lemma 1 2 I c , t h e r e e x i s t s a sequence xt = a R a t ' .
. . Suppose, t h e n , t h a t j < R . L e t t b e t h e l a r g e s t i n d e x less t h a n j ( i f s u c h e x i s t s ) s u c h t h a t xt < a t . Then (~~, a~+~) E H ( a t r a ) s i n c e x t + 1 t + l = a and s o ( p t r x t ) ( P~+~ r a t + l t + l ) 2 . . . 2 ( p j , a j ) > ( p R r x R ) . S i n c e t h i s s e q u e n c e h a s b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d w e have 
i s a s t r i c t c y c l e T ( n o t n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t r u c t e d ) w i t h T < < S. T h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n c o n c l u d e s t h e p r o o f o f Lemma 1 and h e n c e o f t h e
t h e o r e m .
0
FURTHER AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATIONS T h i s p a p e r h a s shown how t h e f i v e methods d i s c u s s e d by
H u n t i n g t o n f i n d t h e i r p l a c e i n a n a x i o m a t i c s e t t i n g which u n i q u el y c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e c l a s s of " g e n e r a l i z e d " H u n t i n g t o n methods by M.
---
One o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t y p e s o f axioms n o t c o n s i d e r e d by H u n t i n g t o n i s t h a t a n a p p o r t i o n m e n t s h o u l d n o t d i f f e r from t h e e x a c t q u o t a s by o n e whole i n t e g e r o r more. S i n c e SD and J a r e n o t t h e -same method (e.g. s e e T a b l e 2 ) it f o l l o w s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t t h e r e i s no house monotone, c o n s i s t e n t method s a t i s f y i n g q u o t a .
I n view o f t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f house m o n o t o n i c i t y and s a t i s -
f y i n g q u o t a a s p r o p e r t i e s of a n a p p o r t i o n m e n t method, i t i s n a t u r a l t o a s k w h e t h e r t h e r e e x i s t s a n y method t h a t o b e y s b o t h p r o p e r t i e s .
There is; moreover, i f c o n s i s t e n c y i s weakened t o " c o n s i s t e n c y S a t i s f y i n g q u o t a , " t h e n t h e r e e x i s t s a u n i q u e method, t h e Q u o t a method, s a t i s f y i n g t h e t h r e e p r o p e r t i e s [ I , 41 .
